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Russia’s Renewed Arms Sale to China






Tensions in the arms sales relationship between Russia and China have been visibly on the rise in recent years.  Yet, in November 2010, Moscow and Beijing announced a large new package of arms sales that appear to have turned a new leaf in this relationship. Much of the tension stemmed from the Chinese defense industry's practice of reverse engineering Russian weapons technology, indigenizing it and then reselling it in third party markets in competition with Moscow. In negotiations, China has long demanded that Russia sell it advanced technologies in its defense platforms or advanced weapons, something that Moscow has been loath to do regarding both the weapons and their components .  Russia has also always been concerned that China might ultimately employ these advanced technologies and systems against it or its friends in Asia. 

For example, in 2006 it refused to sell certain sensitive space technologies to China (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, December 27, 2006).  Nevertheless the restoration of arms sales appears to be connected with a new turn in Sino-Russian relations in China’s favor.  The fifth round of Sino-Russian strategic talks took place form January 23-25 and Russia’s arms sales organization, Rosoboroneksport, has announced that it sees China as Russia’s chief partner in Asia (Interfax, January 19).  This turn in Sino-Russian ties, probably dictated form the highest levels of both governments, appears to have overridden Russia’s mounting concerns about Chinese military developments.

Russian concerns about Chinese competition in Asian, African, and Latin American arms markets and the fact that China’s J-11B and J-15 fighter planes were essentially "clones" of Russia’s SU-27 and Su-33 fighter planes, respectively, are public and cited. Coupled with China’s own growing domestic capability, these factors contributed to a sharp decline in Chinese military purchases, mainly of air and sea weapons (Oruzhiye Rossii, September 29, 2010; Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2010).    Yet, whether or not China’s domestic capability had increased, there is little doubt of Russia’s anger over Chinese practices of copying its weapon systems, and the fact that there was no sign of Beijing stopping this practice.  Consequently both sides had reason to slow down arms purchases and sales.  Indeed, in 2009-10 China has reportedly not placed a major order with Russia and, according to foreign observers, at the Zhuhai Air show in November China displayed its biggest exhibition of aircraft for sale abroad, mainly built with Russian technology and a supposedly Chinese engine (Oruzhiye Rossii, September 29, 2010; Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2010).

China’s ambassador to Russia, Li Huei—at least publicly—attributes the decline in purchases to its own growing capabilities and claims that bilateral cooperation is actually moving to a higher phase while Russia is still implementing past contracts and transferring air, air defense, and naval weapons to China (Interfax, November 17, 2010).  In other words, Li refused to discuss the charges of intellectual piracy in public.  In fact, earlier this year Russia did send S-300 air defenses to China (Global Security Newswire, April 2, 2010; Reuters, April 2, 2010).  So before the meting of the Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation there was no public yielding by either side.  Russian producers like Sukhoi openly proclaimed their desire to ask probing question to China about its cloning of their systems .  Likewise, Russian and French experts were equally frank in stating their concerns that Chinese ship-to-ship missiles might undercut them on price in third party markets .  Finally both Russia and China are competing to bring out as soon as possible their fifth-generation fighter planes (Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 9).

Yet from subsequent developments it seems clear that there were other concerns on Russian minds that led them to resume arms and technology transfers to China--albeit at a reduced rate.  First it is clear from the press record that China’s needs are changing.  Although it still needs and is buying aerial platforms, China now manifests a growing interest in obtaining engines and technologies to maintain the air fleet that it has acquired by sale or by piracy from Russia.  Russia clearly wants to sell China those engines and monopolize this situation, apparently believing that by doing so it will be able to keep selling it Russian aerial platforms and maintain its advantage in the Chinese weapon market (Interfax-AVN Online, November 17, 2010). Second, Russian arms sellers have found that the only way they can discuss their concerns about unlicensed copying is to actually have a relationship with China through formal sessions like that of the Intergovernmental Commission so they cannot simply cease and desist from selling weapons to China if they wish to influence its behavior (Interfax-AVN Online, November 17, 2010).

Third, the Russian government and defense ministry have announced ambitious plans to boost arms sales throughout the world in the next decade to finance concurrent Russian defense reforms.  In 2010 alone, Moscow reportedly sold a record figure of $10 billion worth of arms (RIA Novosti, December 14, 2010).  Yet at the same time Russian analysts fear that arms sales may actually drop because the markets that Russia found to compensate for reduced arms sales to China in the short run—Algeria, Vietnam, Syria, and Venezuela—cannot offset the size of the Chinese market over the long run (Trud, October 29, 2010).  So while China may occupy a lower place or ranking among the customers for Russian defense systems, Beijing is eager to take advantage of those opportunities that are available to Russia, largely in aerial systems and engines .  Fourth, even as Russian military policy is shifting (e.g. to make the Pacific Fleet the main Russian fleet) because of the Chinese threat, Moscow needs to keep an eye on Chinese military policy, and the best way to do so is to preserve arms sales contracts .

For its part, China has entered into open rivalry if not confrontation with the United States over Southeast Asia, arms sales to Taiwan, the value of its currency, and the six-party talks with Korea. Beijing see the progress of the United States’ reset policy with Russia, and appears eager to improve its ties with Moscow and resolve outstanding issues, among which include the issues of piracy and the lack of arms sales.  China also clearly feels the need to continue acquiring foreign systems for those sectors where it has yet to create an adequate domestic base for its own production (OSC Analysis, FBIS SOV, December 3, 2010).  As a result, at the most recent meeting of the Inter-Governmental Commission in November 2010 the two sides signed a protocol for resumption of sales of spare parts, engines for aircrafts, naval and aerial weapons systems and the design of defensive products in the interests of the Chinese side.  The two sides also established a working group to monitor developments growing out of the 2008 bilateral agreement on intellectual piracy (which has not stopped China from its ongoing "cloning" of Russian systems) .   According to Mikhail Dmitiriev, director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, the agreement "provides "the full picture of the contracts realization process and protects from unsanctioned capturing of our intellectual property," although China, he claimed has never transferred that property to a third country.

China is reportedly interested in buying at least 100 117-S aircraft engines (the upgraded version of the Al-31F engine intended for the SU-35 Fighter, the S-400 air defense missile, at least a 100 RD-93 engines, the existing Al-31F and Al-31FN engine for its existing Fighter component, consisting of SU-27s, SU-30s and its own J-10 (a knockoff of the Israeli Lavi Fighter).  Russia has offered it New Ilyushin-476 military cargo planes, MI-171E Helicopters, and the SU-35 Fighter and the Irbis-e radar station.  Meanwhile Rosoboroneksport, Russia’s designated arms seller, hopes to reach agreement with China on a formula for licensed arms production by Chinese firms of Russian arms that protects Russian intellectual property (Vedomosti Online, November 23, 2010; Interfax-AVN Online, November 16, 2010; Interfax-AVN Online, in English, November 18, 2010; ITAR-TASS, November 16, 2010; Interfax, November 15, 2010; RIA Novosti, November 16, 2010).  In other words, Moscow has agreed again to offer China some of its most advanced systems despite prior misgivings about doing so.  Yet, it is doubtful that the establishment of these mechanisms to oversee the proper enforcement of Russian intellectual property will be notably successful in preventing China from its long-standing and pervasive practices of copying Russian systems and selling them abroad after indigenizing them.  Too many vested interest groups and long-standing practices are involved in this process for it to stop just to please Russia, although it is likely that some cosmetic efforts will be made for a while.  In any case, Beijing has alternatives to Russia.  For example, China is already exporting tanks made with Ukrainian engines and Ukraine will participate in the modernization of China’s Y-5 aircraft, probably not the last such occurrence either (ITAR-TASS, November 23, 2010).

These trends suggest that China remains, to some degree, dependent on Russia for the provision of advanced weapons and defense technologies, notably aircraft engines.  This would also suggest a reason why Russian analysts profess not to be unduly alarmed at the unveiling of China’s fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter.  They apparently believe that despite the hoopla attached to this unveiling, that China will remain behind Russia and the US in aircraft technology for a long time even if it will try to compete with Russia once it starts selling the plane (RIA Novosti, December 29, 2010).   It should be noted here as well that the Pentagon too has its doubts as to just how advanced the J-20’s technology is (Bloomberg, January 26). Meanwhile China also needs to ensure that Russia does not lean closer to Washington than it does to Beijing.  On the other hand, Moscow wants to ensure that a Sino-American rapprochement does not occur at its expense and, more importantly, it still has no means of controlling what China does with its systems. Despite Moscow’s successes in selling arms to smaller countries like Algeria and Vietnam in the global arms market, Moscow still needs to be able to sell in large quantities to China. Furthermore, it needs a friendly China on its border even as there are growing signs of alarm in Russia about China’s economic and military prowess.

The strain in the bilateral arms sales and geopolitical tension between a rising China and declining Russia still remain. Yet for the time being the two sides appear to have reached a mutual accommodation.  A close examination of the accords reached here, however, suggests that Russia really cannot control China and furthermore that it needs Chinese cooperation more than China does Russian cooperation.  The overall turn in the relationship indicates China’ growing ability to induce Russian cooperation even as it infringes on Russian interests.  This could lead to more tension if Russia strives to break free of Chinese power.  While there may be an agreement for now, one should not be unduly complacent about it lasting for a long and, more importantly, untroubled time.

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The Complete Inside Story OF "Indigenous" Dhruv/ALH-----Special Report




From the design to the provision of components and ammunition the involvement of foreign companies in the development of the ALH is considerable. At least 29 companies in nine countries across four continents have been involved with the development, licensed production or supply of components or munitions for the ALH. Ten of these companies are based in six EU Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK). Other companies involved include a number based in Israel and the USA. Since its inception, the ALH has been a collaborative effort between the German company Messerschmitt-Bölkow Blohm (now Eurocopter Deutschland) and HAL:




"One thing should be clear. Though it is India's, if not Asia's, first de novodesigned helicopter, it is not ‘indigenous’ in the Indian sense of the term, but a collaborative effort of HAL and specialists from Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm, who built the Eurocopter, which the Advanced Light Helicopter resembles."


It is not clear what configuration of armaments and components will be incorporated into the variants of any ALHs that might eventually be exported to Myanmar, but it is incumbent on governments to ensure that components produced or otherwise originating from within their jurisdiction are not incorporated into military helicopters transferred to Myanmar. The section below provides illustrative examples of key foreign involvement in the development of the ALH.



Core foreign components for the ALH include helicopter engines and rotor blades, as well as hydraulics, cockpit displays, vibration dampers and other "mission-critical parts". In addition, European firms have contributed to the offensive military capability of the attack helicopter version: variants of the ALH have incorporated rocket launchers of Belgian origin, and machine guns and missiles of French origin.




European and US firms have been involved in designing and developing the aircraft and its components. As a consequence — not least with major structural components like engines and rotors — it would be difficult, if not impossible, for HAL to source adequate alternative components from non-European or non-US suppliers. Similarly it may be difficult for HAL to manufacture such components itself without technical support from those firms.



Letters were faxed to each of the companies mentioned in this report, noting the reports that the Government of India was in negotiations with the Government of Myanmar to supply the ALH, and requesting information about their involvement in the development of the ALH through the manufacture and supply of components, technology and/or assistance. The letters also asked about the terms of the licences under which such transfers were made, including any restrictions applied to re-export.



Many of the companies’ responses summarised below specifically state that the contracts conform to their government’s requirements. Nevertheless, should such transfers of the ALH from India go ahead over the coming months, it is likely that military equipment, components and technology supplied from EU and US manufacturers incorporated into the ALH will end up in an embargoed destination. There is no suggestion that these companies will have broken current laws or regulations or deliberately violated the EU arms embargo on Myanmar. However, in almost all of these cases, the exports would not have been permitted from the country where the controlling company is based if they were supplied direct to Myanmar.

 

The following section illustrates the scale of involvement of non-Indian companies in the design.


The European Union


Belgium

Forges de Zeebrugge FZ


Variants of the ALH have incorporated rocket launchers produced by the Belgiam company, Forges de Zeebrugge FZ.For example, the photo below shows the FZ nameplate on the rocket launcher mounted on ALH on display at Farnborough International, UK on 14 August 2006.



 



Forges de Zeebrugge FZ confirmed that they have contracts with both HAL and the Indian Army, which have been approved by the Belgian authorities and are subject to end-use agreements. Confidentiality clauses contained within the contract prevented fuller disclosure of any details surrounding the nature of the deal.


France

Turbomeca


The French company Turbomeca (now part of the Safran Group) has undertaken both the direct export of engines from France to India but has also established licensed production and technology transfer arrangements with HAL to produce engines for the ALH. In February 2003, it was announced that Turbomeca and HAL had signed three major contracts. These included a contract for the supply of TM 333 2B2 engines for application on the HAL helicopter; and another contract for the repair and overhaul licence for the TM 333 2B2. The HAL website states that the ALH continues to use the "Turbomeca TM 333-2B2 Twin Turbo-shaft Engine 746 kw (1000 SHP)".



Turbomeca confirmed that it has three contracts with HAL, two of which cover the supply, repair, servicing and overhaul of the TM333-2B2 engines for the ALH. The company also stated that all its contracts were regulated by the appropriate French export licensing authorities. However in its response to our enquiries the French Government stated that the engines in question are not classified as war material by the French regulations and do not appear in the list of items subject to the Myanmar embargo. In our view, this interpretation is wrong because non-listed items in the EC Dual Use Regulation if incorporated into military items bound for embargoed destinations become licensable, that is subject to the embargo (for more on this see the section on EU export controls on re-exports over military equipmentbelow).

It would therefore appear that the French Government places no restrictions on the transfer of equipment fundamental to the operation of the ALH notwithstanding the fact that it is clearly also used as a military aircraft.


GIAT Industries (Nexter) and MBDA


In July 2006 defence news service Shepherd Rotorhub quoted Hindustan


Aeronautics' chairman Ashok Baweja describing a weaponisation programme was under way for the ALH. This was to include a 20mm gun from the French company GIAT and rockets from European missile manufacturer MBDA. In December 2006, GIAT (now renamed Nexter) announced that it had been awarded a contract by HAL for:



"the supply of 20 THL 20 turrets that will equip the Indian Armed Forces' Advanced Light Helicopter. The order covers the development phase of 20 turrets. The first deliveries will take place in 2008…."



In March 2007 Jane's Information Group reported that HAL signed a deal with MBDA in July 2006 for the supply of air-to-air Mistral missiles for armed versions of the ALH.



Nexter has confirmed that it does supply products to HAL for the ALH. This currently includes twenty ‘THL 20’ 20mm Helicopter turrets. The company also stated that all of its exports are regulated and approved by the appropriate French export licensing authorities and that any additional contracts to supply the ALH that were not stipulated in the original contract would require a further export licence.


Germany

Eurocopter Deutschland (formerly MBB) and now wholly owned by Eurocopter


Eurocopter has been involved (originally as MBB) with the development of the ALH since at least July 1984. In November 1995, it was reported that Eurocopter had submitted a proposal to the Indian Defence Ministry to "co-produce the ALH designed by HAL. It plans to set up production facilities in India to manufacture the ALH for both local and export markets."In 2006 both companies were advertising their mutual co-operation: Eurocopter noting that it was supplying rotor blades for the ALH, and HAL announcing that "Eurocopter, the helicopter manufacturer owned by EADS, has been cooperating with HAL for over four decades … India was the first nation with which Eurocopter signed a licence agreement for technology transfer." Amnesty International wrote to Eurocopter in March 2007 asking for clarification over its role in the development of the ALH. As of 25 June 2007, the company had not responded.



SITEC Aerospace



SITEC Aerospace manufactures a range of components and complete assemblies for flight/engine controls for various types of aircraft. According to company literature on display at Farnborough International 2006, SITEC provides components for the ALH.



SITEC Aerospace confirmed that they supply parts for the ALH, but that they do not export these directly to HAL, but supply them to another unnamed German manufacturer who subsequently incorporates these items into other systems for the ALH.


Italy

Elettronica Aster SpA


The Italian company Elettronica Aster SpA on its website describes HAL as a major customer. According to the "Company and Program Overview", Elettronica Aster SpA has produced and supplied the ALH with a brake system.



Amnesty International wrote to Elettronica Aster SpA in March 2007 to ask for clarifications as to its involvement in the development of the ALH. In its reply dated 15 March, the company had no comment on the specifics of its supply of components for the ALH, stating only that Elettronica Aster SpA’s "export activity is regulated by the rules called out in the Italian Law no.185/’90 (with amendment DDL 1927), establishing the regulation for weapons import/export/transit."


Sweden

Saab AB


Saab Avitronics, the South African joint venture company owned by Saab AB (Sweden) and Saab Grintek (South Africa, itself part owned by Saab AB), has been awarded a multi-million dollar export contract from HAL for the supply of self-protection equipment for installation on the ALH for the Indian Armed Forces.



Amnesty International wrote to Saab AB on 1 June 2007 asking for clarification over its involvement with the ALH. Saab AB replied saying: "All export approvals from the concerned authorities are in place. The export licences are supported by an end-user certificate."


The United Kingdom


APPH Precision Hydraulics


At the 2004 Farnborough arms fair, the UK company APPH Precision Hydraulics Ltd displayed its Hydraulic Package as the following:



"HAL Advanced Light Helicopter Hydraulic Package designed and manufactured by APPH Ltd"



Amnesty International wrote to in March 2007 to ask for clarifications as its involvement in the development of the ALH. As of 25 June 2007, the company had not responded.



FPT Industries Ltd


In 1993 it was reported that FPT Industries Ltd had been awarded a contract to supply floatation equipment for the ALH under development by HAL. FTP Industries is part of GKN Aerospace Services Ltd. In 1997, it was reported that FPT Industries’ self-sealing fuel tank systems were being used in the ALH. In 2007, the FPT Industries website stated that: "FPT equipment is fitted to a range of helicopters including ALH".


In 1997, the then GKN Westland Aerospace Ltd (renamed GKN Aerospace Services Ltd in 2001) was awarded a contract to supply the internal gearbox BR715 for HAL’s ALH.



GKN Aerospace Services Ltd confirmed that they have supplied fuel tanks, floatation equipment and related gaskets and seals for the ALH, but that these are subject to end-use certificates stipulating that they would not be re-exported. The company stated that future supplies for the ALH would be for components and kits for fuel tanks that would be assembled locally in India, but would again be subject to similar end-use undertakings. However, while the UK Government normally requires the presentation of end-use documentation as part of the licensing process, it does not as a rule then include explicit end-use restrictions as a conditionon the export licence. If this is the case in this instance, what force those end-use undertakings have is unclear.



Other third-country involvement in the ALH:

The United States

It should be noted that the US embargo on Myanmar does not specifically mention indirect supplies, nor does it place controls on civilian components that are incorporated into military systems. However, indirect supplies of US military components or other controlled items are subject to re-export controls under the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) system which specifically states that re-export of US-controlled content can only take place with the express permission of the US Government. Section 123.9 "Country of ultimate destination" provides that:


"(a) The country designated as the country of ultimate destination on an application for an export licence, or on a shipper's export declaration where an exemption is claimed under this subchapter, must be the country of ultimate end-use. The written approval of the Department of State must be obtained before reselling, diverting, transferring, transshipping, or disposing of a defense article in any country other than the country of ultimate destination as stated on the export licence, or on the shipper's export declaration in cases where an exemption is claimed under this subchapter. Exporters must ascertain the specific end-use and end-user prior to submitting an application to the Office of Munitions Control or claiming an exemption under this subchapter. End-use must be confirmed and should not be assumed."


However, it is not clear whether components supplied by US companies for the ALH have been specifically designed or adapted for military use. If not, they may fall outside this specification.



Aitech Systems Ltd


In September 2005, it was reported that Aitech Systems Ltd, a US company, had announced it had "received the first production order from the Lahav Division of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) for Display & Mission Computers" for inclusion in the glass cockpit of the ALH. The Lahav Division of IAI is under contract to HAL to develop and provide the avionics system for the HAL.

Deliveries for the first production of Display and Mission Computers were due to be completed by May 2006:


"Aitech will build 400 Display & Mission Computers for the ALH program, to be delivered over the next several years. In addition, Aitech is under contract to IAI to provide the next generation of Display & Mission Computer."


Amnesty International wrote to the company in March 2007 asking for clarifications over its involvement with the ALH, but has yet to receive a reply (as of 25 June 2007).



Lord Corporation


In January 2004, it was reported that Lord Corporation had announced that it had been "awarded the first production contract for its active vibration control system" for the ALH. Lord Corporation had been supplying other parts (such as elastomeric bearings) for the main tail rotor and parts for various "isolators", which together formed part of an anti-resonance isolator system aimed at reducing vibrations in the aircraft." The report also stated that "Lord would supply the vibration dampers for these aircraft with user approvals."



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What Russia’s Stealth Fighter Developments Mean for America------Special Report



Russia’s development of the PAK FA fifth-generation stealth fightercould challenge American air supremacy, especially if Russia sells thePAK FA to its usual buyers of military equipment. In the U.S., closureof the F-22 production line has severely limited America’s ability torespond to PAK FA proliferation by building more F-22s and potentiallyselling them to U.S. allies. The U.S. needs to revise its assessment ofU.S. air superiority needs and then explore ways to modernize andstrengthen the U.S. tactical fighter force.


With America’s closure of the F-22 production line and the recent debutof Russia’s PAK FA fifth-generation stealth fighter, American airsupremacy for the foreseeable future is not as assured as the U.S.Department of Defense once predicted. Indeed, Lieutenant General DavidA. Deptula, recently departed Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Surveillance and Reconnaissance in the U.S. Air Force, recently madethe startling announcement: “For the first time, our claim to airsupremacy is in jeopardy.… The dominance we’ve enjoyed in the aerialdomain is no longer ours for the taking.”


To preserve traditional U.S. margins of military technologicalsuperiority, Congress should review potentially outdated requirementsand projections, and policymakers should push defense officials toenact more forward-looking budgeting and acquisition strategies forU.S. fighter fleets. Increased investment in modernization and newpartnerships with allies like Japan and Israel will be necessary toprevent the airpower balance from tilting in favor of the Russian andChinese air forces and to hedge against the potentially destabilizingproliferation of Russia’s PAK FA fighter to unstable actors, non-stategroups, and/or terrorism-sponsoring rogue states around the world. Forexample, if Syria or Iran acquires the PAK FA, it could provide thefighter to the non-state group Hezbollah to form a proxy air forceagainst Israel.

U.S. Air Power Assumptions Challenged

Defense analysts, officials, and industry personnel have long believedthat the U.S. F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II Joint StrikeFighter would not face serious threats from foreign fifth-generationfighters for the next 20 years. In September 2009, Secretary of DefenseRobert Gates repudiated claims of a looming “fighter gap”—a deficitbetween the services’ fighter aircraft inventories and theiroperational requirements. “[T]he more compelling gap,” he argued, “isthe deep chasm between the air capabilities of the United States andthose of other nations.”

In an earlier speech, he argued:
China…is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 ofthe most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful ofcomparable aircraft for the Chinese.

The Secretary’s claims may now be in doubt. With the cancellation ofthe F-22 and closure of its production line combined with variousdevelopment delays in the F-35 program—the mainstay of America’s futurefighter fleets—U.S. fighter inventories may be significantly smaller incoming years than initially planned. For example, initial operationalcapability for the F-35A, the U.S. Air Force version of the F-35, wasrecently pushed back two years to the end of 2015, now changed to 2016for both the F-35A and the Navy’s F-35C. These delays often increaseproduction costs, forcing reductions in the overall buy. Regrettably,other fiscal pressures will likely squeeze procurement budgets furtherin the coming years and prevent the expenditures needed to reachplanned F-35 force levels.


Meanwhile, Russian fighter and military modernization efforts areproceeding rapidly, defying the expectations of many. In August, Russiaundertook the largest airborne military exercises since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, making “use of automated command and controlsystems.”[6] On January 29, 2010, Russia conducted the first testflight of the T-50, a prototype of the PAK FA, Russia’sfifth-generation fighter jet, which was designed to rival the AmericanF-22. With advanced stealth technology and high-tech avionics, the PAKFA could eventually—as Moscow has repeatedly proclaimed—seriouslychallenge U.S. air supremacy. Russia is also selling modernfourth-generation fighter aircraft to the Indian, Chinese, Algerian,Vietnamese, and Libyan militaries.

The air forces of Russian defense trade partners—including India,China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Libya—could also pose growing challenges.Russia has already sold hundreds of its best fighter aircraft to China,and may sell China the PAK FA as well. China is Russia’s largestpurchaser of Su-27/ Su-30 Flanker fighters, including the more advancedSu-30MKK and Su-30MK2, buying or ordering up to 624 as of 2009. TheSu-27/Su-30 fighters are produced by Sukhoi, the same firm that isdeveloping the PAK FA. Indeed, the Komsomolsk-on-Amur KNAAPO factory,which is producing the Su-27/Su-30 fighters, is located in Khabarovsk,a region that borders China. By 2025, China could have up to 120 PAK FA fighters, compared to America’s 187 F-22As.

PAK FA Program and Potential Foreign Exports

While reduced resources and growing internal defense budget imbalancesimperil U.S. defense procurement plans, Russian defense spending isgetting a boost from oil and gas export revenues, even after the2008–2010 slump in oil prices.
Russiahas the third largest gold and hard currency reserves after China andJapan. State coffers have been expanding quickly, with Russia’s foreignreserves increasing from $437 billion at the end of January 2010 to$503.7 billion by October. Although the Russian economy reliesheavily on exports of raw materials, the government is unlikely toencounter much difficulty funding the PAK FA program, especially withsignificant assistance from India, which plans to inject $30 billioninto the program.


Furthermore,
the PAK FA is expected to be cheaper to producethan the F-22. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has recentlyclaimed that the PAK FA “would be 2.5 to 3 times cheaper.” Currently,the PAK FA is expected to cost less than $100 million per plane, whilethe F-35 is projected to cost between $100 million and $112 million,and the F-22 will cost around $140 million.


The Russian Defense Ministry initially planned to buy 300 PAK FAfighters, but has since reduced its stated requirement to 250 planes,with a preference for the single-seat version. Whether Russia will meetthis target is unclear. As part of the “2011–2020 state armsprocurement program,” the ministry is budgeting $656 billion, whichincludes funding to produce 10 PAK FAs between 2013 and 2015 and 60additional fighters between 2016 and 2020.
Although Russia is leading the program and shouldering the bulk ofthe cost, India is set to provide significant assistance, aiming tohave a 25 percent stake in designing and developing the fighter. Indiais currently negotiating with Sukhoi to build an Indian variant calledthe Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). India reportedly plans topurchase 250 of these fighters: 200 twin-seaters and 50 single-seaters,with an option for future orders that could increase the total to 300.

Mikhail Pogosyan, General Director of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, hasstated: “I am strongly convinced that our joint project will excel itsWestern rivals in cost-effectiveness and will not only allowstrengthening the defense power of Russian and Indian air forces, butalso gain a significant share of the world market.” Pogosyan calculatesthat there could be a world market for 1,000 PAK FAs in the next 40years.


One likely buyer is China. Although Beijing is reportedly developingits own fifth-generation fighter aircraft (the J-12), the Chinesemilitary could conceivably buy up to 250 PAK FA planes, especially ifits own program encounters delays. In addition, Russia would likelyseek to export the PAK FA to Algeria, Libya, Iran, Syria, andVenezuela. Kazakhstan may also purchase the aircraft, as could Malaysiaand Vietnam, thanks to their gas and oil revenues. Indonesia may wantto buy limited numbers to counterbalance the 100 F-35s that Australiaplans to acquire.
America’soil-rich Arab allies may also order PAK FA aircraft if Washingtonrefuses, as expected, to sell them F-35s and instead exports up to 100F-35s to Israel.


The PAK FA will likely form the basis for several foreign variants, inthe same way that the Russian Su-27 Flanker fighter spawned theSu-30MKI multirole fighter for India, the Su-30MKK multirole fighterand Su-30MK2 naval strike fighter for China, the Su-30MKA for Algeria,and the more advanced Su-34 strike aircraft and Su-35 multirolefighter. One possible PAK FA variant is a twin-seat long-range strikeversion similar to the Su-34 or the proposed (and now shelved) FB-22bomber version of the F-22.


With its stealth technology, supercruise capability, and sensor fusion,the F-22 was designed to prevail in present and future air battles. Italso has the ability to carry smart bombs for precision strike missionsin heavily defended battle spaces. Due to its supercruise ability, theF-22 is capable of covering long distances in regions like the ArcticOcean, the continental U.S., the Western Pacific, and the Persian Gulfwith supersonic flight without the need to engage afterburners. Sincethe PAK FA is planned to have similar capabilities,
only the F-22 would be capable of matching the future Russian fighter, if not prevailing over it.


The FB-22 would possess the stealth and supercruise characteristics ofthe F-22A, and it would provide a stealth and supersonic medium-rangebomber capability for the Air Force, filling a niche between the F-35fighter-bomber and the proposed 2018 long-range bomber.The FB-22 wouldbe able to carry 30 Small Diameter Bombs and have 50 percent more rangethan the F-22. In the future, Russia may deploy a medium-bomber versionof the PAK FA while the U.S. Air Force may be left without such abomber capability.


According to Russian officials, the joint Russo– Indian PAK FA/FGFAfighter should be ready by 2015 or 2016. It may also incorporateequipment from third countries, just as Russia has previouslyintegrated French and Israeli technology into its weapons systems.Indian officials hope the FGFA will be fully developed by 2016 so thatit can enter service in 2017.


With a planned price tag of about $100 million per aircraft, the PAK FAwill not be cheap, but it will likely find a market among thosecountries that have purchased Russia’s Su-27/30 fighters. Many of thesecountries have substantial foreign currency reserves. Those that wantto modernize and expand their militaries, expand their global presence,and become increasingly assertive on the world stage or in theirregions will be interested in the PAK FA. If the PAK FA proves to be asuccess, the U.S. should expect it to proliferate among countries withthe means to acquire it and with foreign policies that potentially defyWashington or look toward Moscow.

Understanding the Potential for Trouble

After successful test flights on January 29 and February 12, 2010, theT-50 began standard tests in April. Testing could take several moreyears, according to sources from Sukhoi and statements by PrimeMinister Putin, but some planes could conceivably be deployed inoperational units before testing is completed. This would not beunusual. The first operational F-22s were delivered in September 2003,even though testing continued until November 2005.[Colonel GeneralAlexander Zelin, commander in chief of the Russian Air Force, estimatesthat PAK FA fighters will be delivered to operational units in 2015.Inpreparation, Russian pilots are already receiving training in pilotingfifth-generation fighters.

As one expert recently noted: “In this modern era of stealth combat,there are two types of fighters: stealth fighters and targets.”Similarly, the commander in chief of the Russian navy stated that “itwould be impossible to win contemporary and future wars without air andspace supremacy. Whoever understands this is on the right path.”Mikhail Pogosyan says that “the most important thing is stealth toenemy radar, which allows the aircraft to approach enemy positionswithout being noticed.”


One risk is that Russia or potential PAK FA customers around the worldcould use the sophisticated aircraft to conduct sneak attacks againstU.S. forces or allies. Russian doctrine still considers the U.S. its“principal adversary,” even though successive U.S. Administrations haveannounced that Russia is no longer our enemy.

Viewing the U.S. and NATO as potential opponents in a future war,Russia has designed the PAK FA to compete with the F-22 and todevastate formations of F-35 stealth fighters. It takes more thantechnology to make an advanced fighter classified as fifth-generation,including pilot skill and training, aircraft, and tactics. It remainsto be seen whether Russia will develop advanced operational conceptsand fighter doctrine to employ the PAK FA. If this occurs, it ispossible that the twin-engine F-22, which was devised as an airsuperiority fighter, would perhaps be the only credible match for thePAK FA. Even if the F-22 proves superior, PAK FAs may still pose aformidable threat. F-35s, which were partly designed to serve as forcemultipliers for the F-22, may be vulnerable to PAK FA attack. Althoughthe U.S. plans to build more than 2,000 F-35s, the numerical advantageof the F-35 fleet could potentially be offset by the PAK FA’s largerweapon capacity, especially if it proves technologically superior.



In addition, the PAK FA could pose a threat to the F/A-18E/F SuperHornet and F-35C Lightning II squadrons operating from America’saircraft carriers. The Russian navy plans to deploy 15–20 naval PAK FAson its aircraft carrier after it is modernized, perhaps by 2020. Russiamay also seek to reduce the numerical advantage of the overall U.S.fighter fleet by building large numbers of a lighter version of the PAKFA, a possible equivalent to the F-35.


In a dogfight, U.S. Air Force models predict that small formations ofF-22 fighters would prevail over far larger numbers offourth-generation enemy fighters because the F-22’s superior stealthwould give it a substantial advantage.[39] However, how the F-22 wouldfare against the PAK FA is unclear. The PAK FAs may ultimately matchthe F-22s in capability and possibly outnumber them. It is also unclearhow mixed formations of F-22s and more numerous F-35s would fareagainst PAK FA formations or against combinations of PAK FAs andlighter variants. The Department of Defense needs to develop acomprehensive understanding of the capabilities of the various Russianplatforms to accurately gauge the threat to U.S. planes and to developappropriate responses.

The PAK FA Compared to U.S. Fighters

According to information in the public domain, the PAK FA could besuperior to the F-35, equal or nearly equal to the F-22, and superiorto fourth-generation fighters. This section compares these fightersacross a range of capabilities and discusses nascent and unfoldingsecurity implications.

Stealth.

The PAK FA will likely incorporate several advanced stealth features.According to the Sukhoi firm, the fighter’s “use of composite materialsand advanced technologies, improved aerodynamics, and reduced engineheat signature minimizes its radio-frequency, optical and infraredvisibility.” Like the F-22, the PAK FA was designed according to theprinciple of planform alignment, which means that surfaces andedges—such as the leading edges and horizontal control surfaces of thewings and the vertical sides of the engines’ air intakes—are aligned toshare the same angles. The pilot’s canopy is also angled to deflectincoming radar waves away from the radar source.


An additional stealth feature that could be incorporated is curvedS-ducts to mask the engine compressor blades from radar. The T-50prototype tested earlier this year was not fitted with stealthy enginenozzles, but the operational version of the PAK FA will likely havestealthy thrust-vector-control nozzles, like those on the F-22. Astealthy engine nozzle has been fitted on one of Russia’s Su-27 testaircraft.

The PAK FA is expected to be built with radar-absorbing material.About 30 percent of the aircraft fuselage will be made of compositematerials. It could also be fitted with a “stealthogenic” system, anadvanced technology reportedly developed by Soviet scientists. Thisstealthogenic technology is a form of anti-radar cloaking device using“wisps of plasma formed by pencils of electromagnetic rays from specialgenerators installed on the aircraft; the plasma absorbs radio waves,reducing the aircraft’s radar cross section (RCS) approximately 100times, making it almost invisible to radar. The U.S. Air Force isreportedly interested in using a similar, cold plasma cloaking device“as the next generation of stealth technology” for its fighter aircraft.
The Indian version of the PAK FA is said to have a radar crosssection of 0.5 square meter, the equivalent of a missile’s RCS. Bycomparison, older tactical jets have RCSs between 5 and 100 squaremeters. For example, the fourth-generation Su-30MKI has a RCS ofapproximately 20 square meters.

Russia is likely to reserve the more advanced stealth capabilities forits own aircraft. The stealthogenic cloaking device under developmentcould reduce the PAK FA’s radar cross section even further, making itpotentially as stealthy as the F-22, which has the RCS of a small birdor a bumblebee at between 0.001 and 0.01 square meter. Thestealthogenic system may even enable the fighter to carry a full loadof missiles, bombs, and/or drop tanks externally and still remainstealthy. It is possible Russia may have already tested the technologysuccessfully; if so, one could reasonably assume Russia would then bereadying it for deployment on the operational version of the PAK FA.
The F-35 normally carries two beyond-visual-range AMRAAM missiles andtwo JDAM-guided bombs in its two internal weapon bays. It could carrytwo additional AMRAAMs or AIM-9X Sidewinders under its wings, but thiswould make it less stealthy.Based on the current capabilities ofRussian airborne fire-control radars, the PAK FA’s activeelectronically scanned array (AESA) radar can simultaneously detect,track, and target six to eight F-35s with impaired stealth, offsettingthe advantage of the additional weapons.



The PAK FA and F-22 differ from the F-35 in that both can carry twoshort-range air-to-air missiles in internal side compartments, whichsignificantly reduces their RCS and enables them to maintain theirstealth outlines, even when carrying additional weapons. The F-35’sengine nozzle may give it a stealth disadvantage versus the PAK FA.This means a PAK FA flying high above an F-35 could potentially detectand track the F-35’s nozzle. In a battle against an F-35 formation, thePAK FA’s stealth and radar would likely be significant forcemultipliers.

Radar.

Although the T-50 prototype probably used a modified Irbis-E radar (thepassive electronically scanned array technology used on the Su-35fighter), the Russians are developing more advanced radar systems forthe PAK FA. Approximately 30 companies are developing the PAK FA’sintegrated avionics suite.
Ultimately, the PAK FA is expected to have an AESA radar system with1,500 individual transmitter/receiver (T/R) modules. A prototype isbeing tested, and development should be completed in mid-2010.[ Incomparison, the F-22’s AESA radar system has about 2,000 T/R modules.

In addition to AESA radar, the PAK FA will have a side-looking radarand a rear-facing radar. The sting fairing in the tail, located betweenthe engine’s exhaust nozzles, may harbor a small fire-control radar fordetecting airborne targets and attacking missiles and to providefire-control solutions for its air-to-air missiles. With AESA radars inthe nose and tail, the PAK FA could cover 120 degrees of both theplane’s front hemisphere and its rear hemisphere. In addition, theaircraft will have an L-band AESA radar in conformal arrays on thewings’ leading edges. According to some reports, L-band arrays candetect stealth aircraft the size of the F-35.

The PAK FA’s design may also allow placement of additional AESAconformal arrays on the fighter’s surfaces that could provide radarcoverage of its starboard and port sides, allowing all-round radarsurveillance. Perhaps with this in mind V. K. Naik, the IndianAir Force Chief of Staff, said that the FGFA’s “highly advancedavionics…[would be] giving 360-deg. situational awareness.”In addition,the PAK FA’s AESA radar will have electronic countermeasures that canjam enemy radar. The F-35 has a similar system.

Like the F-35’s radar, the PAK FA’s radar can use radio waves to burnthe electronic systems of enemy radar, the command-and-control computerof a surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery, and perhaps even the flightcomputer of an enemy fighter. The L-band AESA radars on the aircraft’swings could potentially track, locate, and jam the Joint TacticalInformation Distribution System (JTIDS), Multifunctional InformationDistribution System (MIDS), and Link-16 communications links andemitters.


The PAK FA’s optoelectronic system may incorporate a LADAR (laserradar) to identify targets, including other stealth fighters, byproviding an image of a contact in three dimensions. The PAK FA mayalso incorporate a more advanced, fifth-generation version of theinfrared search and track/ laser rangefinder (IRST/LR) optoelectronicsystem that was used in earlier Russian fighter aircraft. The T-50prototype has already been fitted with a newer version. The system hasa sensor in the cockpit and uses infrared and television channels forday and night operations; a laser rangefinder for accurate targeting;and a “look down/shoot down” capability for detecting, tracking, andengaging targets over land, sea, and air. The system can detectapproaching fighters at 40 kilometers (km) and departing enemy fightersat 100 km.


According to some reports, a Russian-made IRST/ LR may have alreadyproven effective in downing U.S. stealth aircraft. Although the U.S.Air Force officially determined that the F-117A stealth fighter downedduring the Kosovo crisis of 1999 was shot down by a Russian-madesurface-to-air missile launched by the Serbs, some military analystsbelieve that it was shot down by a Russian-made MiG-29 operated by theYugoslav air force. According to that account, the Serbian MiG-29 firedits infrared-guided missiles at the F-117A and destroyed it with thefirst missile launched. Some accounts say that the Serb pilot used theMiG-29’s IRST/LR system to stealthily detect, track, and engage theF-117A, even though the U.S. plane was designed to mask its engines’exhaust infrared signature. According to sources interviewed by Jane’sDefense Weekly, the Serbs may have intercepted the F-117A using thefighter’s mission flight plan, which was allegedly stolen by a spyworking for Russian military intelligence who had infiltrated NATO.


The F-22 does not have a built-in IRST/LR system, but such a systemcould be added. The F-35’s electro-optical sensor system (EOSS), whichincludes the optronic distributed aperture system (DAS) and theelectro-optical targeting system (EOTS), will give the fighter 360degrees of infrared coverage for searching and tracking enemy surfaceand air targets. Using DAS, the F-35 could fire a short-rangeair-to-air missile at an enemy fighter in a lock-on mode and thenescape from the fight.[71] Ultimately, it is unclear exactly how thePAK FA’s radar systems will compare in power and sensitivity with theradar systems in the F-22 and the F-35.

Range.
The PAK FA’s combat range will be roughly equivalent to theF-22’s range, but possibly greater than the ranges of some F-35variants. According to Russian sources, the PAK FA will have a maximumrange of 5,500 km. Realistically, this is probably its maximumrange with at least one air refueling. Similarly, the Russianfourth-generation Su-30MK multirole fighter reportedly has a top combatrange of 5,200 km with one in-flight refueling. With internal fueltanks, the PAK FA—like the Su-30M—will likely have a range of about3,000 km. By comparison, the F-22 has a reported combat range of morethan 2,963 km with two external fuel tanks. According to Russiansources, the PAK FA will be capable of repeated air refueling forextended operations.




In contrast, the U.S. Air Force’s F-35A and the U.S. Navy’scarrier-based F-35C will have a range of about 2,222 km with internalfuel tanks, but the U.S. Marine Corps’s F-35B will have a range ofabout 1,667 km.
Weapons.

With a maximum length of about 22 meters and a wingspan of 14.8 meters,the PAK FA will be similar in size to the Russian Su-27 Flankerfighter. Both aircraft are larger than the F-22, which has an overalllength of 18.9 meters and a wingspan of around 13.6 meters. Because ofits larger size, the PAK FA will be able to carry more fuel, moremissiles, and heavier bombs internally. It will also be able to carrynumerous kinds of weapons, enabling it to simultaneously attackmultiple surface and air targets in all weather conditions— hence, itsclassification as a multirole fighter.


The PAK FA could carry a deadly mix of weapons. Russia’s Vympel StateMachine-Building Design Bureau is reportedly developing very long-rangebeyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles and short-range air-to-air missilesdesigned to fit inside the PAK FA’s weapon bays.[82] Development of thenew R-77M BVR missile is due to be completed in 2010. The PAK FA couldcarry eight of these missiles in its two main weapon compartments. Likethe F-35, the PAK FA may also be able to carry an additional BVRmissile attached to the inner side of each weapon compartment door,enabling it to carry four R-77M missiles while reserving internal spacefor two bombs or two very long range air-to-air missiles. Anotherweapon under development for the PAK FA is the ramjet-powered R-77M-PD,which has a reported range of 160 km, twice that of the R-77M. The PAKFA could carry four of them internally.


The original R-37 air-to-air missile (maximum range of 300 km) wasdesigned to shoot down valuable air targets, such as airborne warningand control system (AWACS) aircraft, Joint Surveillance Target AttackRadar System (J-STARS) aircraft, air tankers, reconnaissance planes,electronic warfare aircraft, transport aircraft, Airborne Laseraircraft, and bombers. Improved versions of the R-37 missile are underdevelopment, including the R-37M very long-range air-to-air missile(range of 300 km to 400 km) and the Izdelie 810 (range of 375 km to 450km). They will also be able to engage targets at extremely highaltitudes. Both of these next-generation missiles will have active andpassive radar guidance systems designed to seek enemy radar andelectronic countermeasures emissions. In passive mode, an R-77M missilecould conceivably target an F-35 at up to 240 km if the F-35 is usingits AESA radar in a jamming operation.


In addition to the larger weapons compartments, the PAK FA has twosmaller compartments located in the rear, which could each carry oneshort-range air-to-air missile.[88] This design feature was borrowedfrom the F-22, which has two smaller side compartments, which couldeach hold one AIM-9M or AIM-9X .



The PAK FA’s smaller compartments could accommodate several types ofshort-range air-to-air missiles. One possibility is an improved VympelR-73M short-range air-to-air missile with a high off-boresightcapability, which enables it to turn 160 degrees to engage enemytargets in the plane’s rear hemisphere using infrared guided-missiletechnology. It could lock on before or after launch, and the rear AESAradar could provide the necessary targeting information. This newmissile, the Izdelie 760 or R-74, may have a range of around 40 km. Itis due to enter production this year. Alternatively, the PAK FA couldcarry the Vympel K-30, a new compact short-range air-to-air missile, orthe K-MD short-range air-to-air missile, a new weapon for close combatand for shooting down enemy missiles, which could be developed by 2013.

In its larger weapon compartments, the PAK FA could accommodate twoprecision-guided 1,500 kilogram (kg) bombs, such as the new KAB-1500LGfamily of laser-guided bombs. The PAK FA could also carry twosatellite-guided KAB-500S-E bombs, which weigh 500 kg, or new versionsthat could weigh 1,500 kg. These bombs are dubbed “Russia’s JDAM” afterthe highly effective U.S. bomb guidance package.

The U.S. Phantom Ray unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), which has beenproposed as the basis for a future bomber, could carry two 1,000 kgJDAM bombs, or a payload of up to 2,000 kg, on a long-range strikemission of 3,704 km. The stealthy UCAV can also carry eight SmallDiameter Bombs and refuel in the air independently and repeatedly toenable it to conduct global strike operations.[94] The PAK FA, bycontrast, could have an internal bomb payload exceeding 3,000 kg. Inaddition, the PAK FA might be able to carry two subsonic Kh-35Eanti-ship missiles (range of 130 km) internally.[95] The PAK FA mayalso be able to carry two Kh-35UE GLONASS satellite-guided missiles,which can strike land targets at a range of 260 km.

The PAK FA may also have up to eight external hardpoints to which additional missiles and bombs could be mounted.
TheIndian FGFA and the PAK FA may be armed externally with “BrahMossupersonic missiles,”[98] which were jointly developed by Russia andIndia, or the 3M55 Oniks anti-ship missile, which has a maximum speedof Mach 2.6 at altitude and a range of at least 300 km.

Speed.

The PAK FA and F-22 are expected to have roughly equivalent top speedsand altitudes, but the F-35 is potentially less capable in both areas.The F-22 has demonstrated supercruise speeds above Mach 1.5 and isdesigned for sustained supersonic operation without using afterburners.Reportedly, it has a maximum supercruise speed of Mach 1.82 at 30,000feet (9,000 meters) altitude. Russian sources claim that the PAK FA isslightly faster (Mach 1.83) at 30,000 feet.High supercruise speedsenable these aircraft to control wide expanses of territory. The F-35will not have supercruise capability.



Using afterburners, the F-22 has a maximum speed of about Mach 2.5,likely faster than the PAK FA. Although the Russian air force initiallyestablished the PAK FA’s maximum speed at Mach 2.5, it revised itsoperational requirement downward to Mach 2 in December 2004.Nevertheless, the PAK FA will probably be able to reach Mach 2.45 withafterburners. The T-50 and F-22 will likely have the same serviceceiling of about 20,000 meters. By contrast, the F-35’s maximum speedat altitude is about Mach 1.6 or more than Mach 1.8 with afterburners,and its maximum altitude is estimated to be 15,000 meters.

Maneuverability.

The F-22’s engine nozzles have thrust vector control for superiormaneuverability, which can be essential in close air combat and forsuccessfully evading attacking missiles. The PAK FA will incorporatethe same capability. However, the F-35 is not planned to be fitted withthrust vector control technology.

Both F-22 and F-35 fighters will likely have shorter takeoff distancesthan the PAK FA. In air interception mode, the F-22 may be able to takeoff from an airstrip of only 274 meters.[107] On land, the Marine Corpsvertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL) F-35B is capable of takingoff in just 167 meters. By contrast, the PAK FA requires an airstrip of300 meters to 400 meters.[109] The F-22 also has a slightly highermaximum takeoff weight of 38 tons,compared to the PAK FA’s reported 37tons.

Engine


The PAK FA will be fitted with a new “engine of the second stage,”which is set to begin development in 2010 or 2011.The engines are beingdeveloped by the United Engine Building Corporation in cooperation withNPO Saturn and Salyut, Russia’s two largest producers of aircraftengines. The engine in the T-50 prototype is the NPO Saturn 117M, animproved, modernized version of the 117S engine in Russia’s Su-35fourth-generation-plus aircraft, which already incorporatesfifth-generation technologies, including a full-authority digitalengine control system and three dimensional thrust vectoring controlnozzles. The first operational PAK FAs would use the 117M engines.Later PAK FAs would use the new second-stage engine when it enters intoservice.



According to Russian sources, the new PAK FA engine could provide17,500 kg of thrust.[115] Realistically, the engine may only achieve alower thrust. It is still being developed, and Pogosyan stresses thatthe engine will not be ready before 2015 and could take up to 12additional years to develop fully.

Communications.

One feature of fifth-generation fighters is the ability to communicatevast amounts of tactical information in real time within a formation offighters. The F-22 has an advanced communications, navigation, andidentification system called the TRW AN/ASQ-220. It has multifunctionantennas distributed in conformal arrays along the leading edges of thewings and vertical control surfaces, which enable radar track warning,missile launch detection, threat identification, and communication ofthis information between aircraft.

It is unclear whether the PAK FA will have a comparable system, but itwill likely have communication equipment that allows real-time dataexchange within flight groups and with ground-based controlsystems.[119] For example, the Indian FGFA will reportedly have a “veryhigh degree of network centricity” and “multi-spectral reconnaissanceand surveillance systems.” Like the F-22 and the F-35, the PAK FA andthe Indian FGFA will presumably have sensor data fusion, which willorganize the information into a unified tactical picture and feed it tothe pilot in easily usable form.


The PAK FA may possibly be one step ahead of the F-22 and F-35 incomputer processing functions. The PAK FA’s computer will not onlyprocess data from various sensors and sources and provide it to thepilot, but also function as a battle management system. Instead of thesystem serving as the pilot’s pocket combat information center, itcould serve as a combat direction center by analyzing the informationand offering the pilot combat decisions from which to choose. The headof Avionika, Russia’s leading avionics manufacturer, described the PAKFA as having “advanced avionics that act as an electronic pilot.”Avionika representatives claim that “[t]he fighter itself analyses thesituation and offers options to the pilot,” which “greatly reduces themental load on the pilot and allows him to focus on tactical tasks.”


Whereas the F-22’s sensor fusion technology is touted as allowing thepilot to spend “less time monitoring basic systems and more time makingcombat decisions,”[123] the PAK FA’s battle management system couldallow Russian pilots to spend less time making combat decisions ifthese were already made by the fighter’s artificial intelligence. Inthis case, the pilot would then simply choose the best tacticaldecision offered by the plane’s “electronic pilot” and press a button,which could give the pilot a decisive time advantage in combat. GeneralNikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian ArmedForces, describes the PAK FA’s computer system as so powerful that itpractically has “human intelligence.”

The PAK FA’s electronic pilot can also fly the plane autonomouslyin many situations, in much the same way that a UCAV is controlled. Inother situations, the human pilot could use his discretion to fly thefighter manually, particularly to perform evasive maneuvers.


The T-50’s instrument panel is dominated by two large colormultifunction displays, similar to the Su-35’s instrument panel. Thescreen arrangement may have been influenced by the cockpit design ofthe F-35 with two large multifunction displays integrated to form onelarge display. It is widely thought to be a simpler, easier-to-readarrangement than the four-multifunction-display design in the F-22cockpit. The T-50’s displays are surrounded by control buttons, incontrast to the F-35’s touch screen technology. Touch screen technologymay be incorporated into later versions of the PAK FA, depending on howthe systems perform in testing.


Like the F-22, the T-50 currently has a heads-up display (HUD), atransparent display that presents data without requiring a pilot tolook away from the view through the windshield. In future versions ofthe PAK FA, pilots may have helmet-mounted displays (HMD), like thoseplanned for the F-35 and upgraded F-22.[ HMDs are similar to HUDs, butproject the information onto the pilot’s visor, allowing the pilot toobtain situational awareness and cue weapons systems based on thedirection the pilot’s head is facing.


Implications for U.S. Defense Policy and Force Structure

If the PAK FA proves to be as deadly as Russian officials claim, thePentagon will need to revise its assessment of U.S. air superiorityrequirements. New requirements could expose larger fighter shortfallsin the Air Force and Navy than are currently predicted—not justnumerically, but also in terms of vital air superiority capabilities.If a new, comprehensive assessment leads the U.S. Air Force to reviseits fighter requirements upward in numbers and/or capabilities, the AirForce, Department of Defense, and Congress should explore ways tomodernize and strengthen the U.S. tactical fighter force.

Specifically, Congress should:
Fund F-22 tooling to preserve future options. Given the uncertainlong-term threat environment and the possible proliferation of PAK FAfighters to countries that are hostile to the U.S. and its allies,purchasing additional F-22s may be in the national interest, both toaugment U.S. fighter forces and to enable loyal allies to defendthemselves against the PAK FA threat. The best way to preserve thatoption would have been to sustain domestic production in the U.S.Regrettably, with the F-22 production line shut down, resumingproduction may prove prohibitively expensive. Nonetheless, to hedgeagainst this threat, the U.S. Air Force has decided to “retain toolingfor the F-22” so that it can repair and modernize existing F-22s andpossibly manufacture new Raptors in the future. Congress should fundthe maintenance of F-22 tooling for the next 10 years.

Allow Japan and Israel to acquire export variant F-22s. Anotherhelpful hedge against uncertainty would be for Congress to allow loyalallies, such as Japan and Israel, to purchase an allied variant of theF-22 from the U.S. This would preserve the U.S. capability toprocure additional F-22s and improve their capabilities if needed. InJune 2010, Boeing announced that it would share F-18 technologies withJapan and allow Japan to develop a new derivative of the F/A-18 SuperHornet itself. Similar arrangements should be made for the developmentof F-22 technologies.

The U.S. could encourage Lockheed Martin and Boeing to allow Japanand Israel access to some F-22 technologies so that they can developthem further in pursuit of F-22 allied variants. Israel AerospaceIndustries is in negotiations to manufacture the wings for its futureF-35. If the PAK FA is exported to countries in the Middle East andproves as effective as Russia and India have been claiming, the F-22would be the best aircraft to guarantee the Israeli Air Force’s airsuperiority in the region.


Invest in pilot training.
The short-sighted decision to cancel F-22 production has constrainedthe U.S. ability to improve the technological and numerical advantagesof its fighters, but the U.S. military still maintains a significantskills overmatch. America’s pilots are the best trained in the world.Maintaining this advantage could prove decisive on the battlefield.However, wartime demands and financial strains from current operationsin Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have undermined pilot training tosome degree. The range and intensity of training courses have sufferedas scarce resources have been diverted toward developing capabilitiesfor ongoing operations. Congress should renew its efforts to fully fundaviation training to help to sustain American dominance of the skies.


Fully fund the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and develop additional forcemultipliers. Investing in additional force multipliers is another wayto maximize the impact of limited numbers of F-22s. Congress shouldprovide adequate funding and oversight to ensure that the F-35 programsucceeds. Congress should fully fund the President’s fiscal year 2011budget request for 42 F-35s. Congress should then ask the DefenseDepartment to explore an additional cost-effective option to buildstealth unmanned combat aerial vehicles. These could operate from landbases and aircraft carriers, conducting intelligence, reconnaissance,and surveillance missions as well as strike operations with the F-35.In a tactical scenario, F-22s and F-35s could engage enemy fighters inair combat, while other formations of F-35s and UCAVs attack SAM andradar sites, command and control centers, and air bases, overwhelmingthe adversary’s defenses with sheer numbers.
Build an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. IfCongress fails to fund the alternate engine this year, even though theprogram is more than 80 percent complete, the success of the F-35 willdepend on only one type of engine. In 2035, the F-35 will constitute 90percent of all U.S. fighters. Thus, because the F-35 is a single-engineplane, a problem with the engine could ground all F-35s until theproblem is identified and fixed, unless an alternative engine isavailable. Such a scenario constitutes an unacceptably high risk.Further, in 2009, Congress passed an acquisition reform law thatrequires competition for all major subsystems, including fighterengines. This engine program would also help to ensure that the U.S.maintains engine competition for future fighter programs includingpotential sixth-generation aircraft.

Strengthen economic and military-to-military cooperation with India.India’s involvement in the PAK FA program could be potentially helpful. Alarge fighter fleet in the hands of the world’s largest democracy and akey American partner could counterbalance China’s growing air powercapabilities and other powers in the region. Given the historicalrivalry between India and China, New Delhi will likely seek to convinceMoscow to restrict exports of advanced weapons technology, such as thePAK FA fighter, to China. Indeed, India may make its participation inthe project contingent on such restrictions. India is increasinglyrelying on U.S. weapons technology and equipment to fulfill itsmilitary modernization requirements, while still maintaining a strongdefense relationship with Russia, its long-standing friend.
The U.S. should continue to strengthen economic and securitycooperation with India. The U.S. Air Force and Indian Air Force shouldcontinue to conduct joint wargaming exercises, such as Red Flag in2008. Just as Lockheed Martin reportedly offered the F-35C to theIndian Navy to deploy on its future aircraft carriers, theAdministration should encourage the Indian Air Force to acquire theJoint Strike Fighter, allowing it to operate alongside the FGFA.


Continue to modernize the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force and Congressshould adopt a longer view and begin to research and develop asixth-generation fighter. For the first time since the beginning ofmilitary aviation, the U.S. military does not have a manned aircraftprogram under development. Boeing has already revealed its designconcept for a sixth-generation fighter, featuring a stealth andtailless aircraft with supercruise capability that would replace theNavy’s F/A-18E/F in 2025 and the F-22 in 2027– 2028. As the U.S.military margins of technological superiority decline across the board,select competitors and potential future challengers are embarking ontheir own military modernizations. Rather than cede ground, the U.S.should begin developing new fighter aircraft and air defenses that areso effective that they discourage rivals from developing or eveninvesting in stealth fighter aircraft. The greater the U.S. air poweradvantage, the riskier and costlier other countries’ air powerinvestments will be.


Deploy networked anti-stealth surveillance against emerging stealthyair threats. In cooperation with Israel, the U.S. should produce anddeploy a new generation of CAEW with “track before detect” technologyfor both Air Force and Navy aviation to detect stealth aircraft andlow-observable flying craft. In addition, the U.S. should deployelectronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft with an airborne detectionsystem similar to the Czech Tamara, which can reportedly detect stealthaircraft using the signals from its avionics. Surveillance satellitesequipped with radar may also be able to detect and track stealthfighters because the upper surface of their stealth designs might notbe as stealthy against radar waves from space. ELINT satellites mightalso detect the signals from the avionics of stealth fighters flying information. Stealth fighters can also be detected with low-frequencymetric-band radars by using computers to identify low-observabletargets in a cluttered environment. Ladar (laser radar) in combinationwith radar could help to detect, track, and identify air targets,including stealth aircraft.
Conclusion

The decision by the Obama Administration and Congress to permanentlyclose the F-22 production line has exposed the U.S. and its allies toincreased security risks in the future. This was entirely predictable.In a rapidly changing threat environment in which rising powers andpotential rivals are expanding their global presence, developingadvanced weapons systems, and becoming more assertive, the U.S. needsto preserve a wide range of core defense capabilities to ensure thatthe U.S. military will remain dominant and can hedge against allpossible contingencies. Instead, the U.S. has reduced its aerospacemanufacturing to one fifth-generation fighter production line, whileChina and Russia are operating 12 fighter and bomber lines between themtoday.

Although the F-22 cancellation decision took a valuable defense optionoff the table, Congress can still salvage other possibilities for thefuture. Congress and the Pentagon should focus on widening the U.S.lead in the areas where the nation retains a competitive advantage,such as piloting skills, research and development, and innovation.Defense and military leaders should work with friends and allies toreinforce collective defense and to ensure that the world’sfreedom-loving democracies maintain their ability to secure the skies.

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Hawks vs. Doves: Beijing Debates “Core Interests” and Sino-U.S. Relations


An intriguing divergence of views has been exposed within China’sforeign-policy establishment on how to handle the country’s worseningties with the United States that may highlight a growing dissonancebetween China’s civilian and military establishments.

Sino-Americanrelations have taken a confrontational turn since Washington indicatedlast month that the resolution of sovereignty disputes in the SouthChina Sea was a key American “national interest.” This overture byWashington was widely seen as being made in response to Beijing’sassertion a few months earlier that the whole South China Sea was a“core [Chinese] national interest” that brooked no outsideinterference. At the same time, war games that began on August 16 bythe American and South Korean navies in the Yellow Sea haveinadvertently confirmed Beijing’s perception of Washington’s“anti-China containment policy.” Up until now, hard-line elements inthe upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—andparticularly the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—have driven Beijing’shigh-decibel response to the American challenge. Yet, perhapsindicative of the fact that the Hu Jintao leadership is still weighingdifferent options, flexible and even conciliatory approaches todefusing the diplomatic crisis are being aired in the state media.


Giventhat a root cause of the Sino-American row was Beijing’s decision toexpand its definition of “core national interests” beyond traditionalareas such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, it is significant that theofficial press has held relatively moderate viewpoints on thissensitive issue. Han Xudong, a national security expert at the NationalDefense University (NDU), raised eyebrows when he indicated in lateJuly that China should adopt a cautious attitude when staking out thecountry’s hexin liyi or “core interests.” Han pointed out that “our[China’s] comprehensive national strength, especially military power,is not yet sufficient to safeguard all our core national interests.”Thus, prematurely publicizing all of China’s core interests might becounter-productive. Moreover, the noted strategist contended, excessivestress on “core interests” could result in China’s diplomats andmilitary personnel “putting emphasis only on core interests andneglecting non-core interests.” Professor Han recommended that Beijingrelease China’s list of hexin liyi in a phased, step-by-step fashion.“As China becomes stronger, we can publicize by installments those coreinterests that our country can effectively safeguard,” Han added(Outlook Weekly, July 25; Xinhua News Agency, July 25).

Moreimportantly, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR) senior researcher Da Wei has warned against the “arbitraryexpansion” of China’s core interests. Da advocated a “minimalistdefinition” of hexin liyi, adding that “we must prevent the arbitraryextension of the parameters of hexin liyi in the wake of the rise of[China’s] national power.” The ranking expert on U.S. affairs indicatedthat a country should adopt a “broad and rough” rather than “narrow”interpretation of its core interests. He cited the issue of territorialintegrity, which is considered of core interest for most countries.“When handling territorial disputes, many countries often adoptcompromises such as exchanging [disputed] territories or recognizingthe status quo,” he pointed out. “Often, big powers may ‘let go of’some disputed areas. This doesn’t mean that such countries haveforsaken their core interests” (People’s Daily Net, July 27; GlobalTimes, July 27). 

The views of Han and Da, of course, beg thequestion of what constitutes the full array of Beijing’s “core nationalinterests.” For example, given the CCP leadership’s vehement objectionto foreign countries conducting military maneuvers in internationalwaters in the Yellow Sea that began on August 16, is this patch ofwater wedged between China and the Koreas also China’s hexin liyi? Itis little wonder that the South Korean media has recently been blastingBeijing for putting the entire Korean Peninsula into its sphere ofinfluence (Korea Times, August 7; Global Times, August 9). While it isunlikely that Chinese authorities will publicize a full run-down oftheir core interests, it is significant that quite a few hardlinershave been pushing for the broadest possible—andever-expanding—definition of hexin liyi. In either case, however, thisessentially means that as China becomes stronger—and requires moreresources to sustain its march toward superpower status—its list ofcore interests will grow accordingly.

In an article publishedlast year on “the boundaries of national interests,” PLA Dailycommentator Huang Kunlun noted that China’s national interests had gonebeyond its land, sea and air territories to include areas such as thevast oceans traversed by Chinese oil freighters—as well as outer space.“Wherever our national interests have extended, so will the mission ofour armed forces,” Huang wrote. “Given our new historical mission, theforces have to not only safeguard the country’s ‘territorialboundaries’ but also its ‘boundaries of national interests’.” “We needto safeguard not only national-security interests but also interestsrelating to [future] national development,” he added (PLA Daily, April1, 2009; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], April 2, 2009). Caveats given by NDU’sHa—and particularly CICIR’s Da—reflect fears on the part of moderateopinion-makers that theories such as Huang’s will stoke the flames ofthe “China threat” theory—and deal a blow to the country’s relationswith its neighbors.

Of perhaps more practical relevance totackling the South China Sea imbroglio is well-known academic PangZhongying’s suggestion that Beijing should actively consider a duobian,or multilateralist strategy. In an early August article in GlobalTimes, Pang, a veteran international relations professor at Beijing’sRenmin University, argued that “there will be considerable difficultyfor Beijing to maintain its ‘bilateral’ approach” to ironing outterritorial rows with countries and regions including Vietnam, thePhilippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. Beijing has insisted fordecades that sovereignty-related negotiations be conducted on aone-on-one basis between China on the one hand and individual claimantson the other. The CCP leadership has refused to consider optionsincluding China-ASEAN negotiations or “internationalized” talksinvolving third parties such as the United States. “In the past twodecades, China has accumulated a lot of experience in multilateral[diplomatic] operations,” Pang wrote, adding that the South China Seaissue could be resolved on a multilateral platform that involvesparties including ASEAN, the United States, Japan and the UnitedNations. “Ruling out multilateralism will be tantamount to giving[China’s] opponents pretexts to attack China,” he indicated (GlobalTimes, August 5; Sina.com, August 6).

Moreover, individualdiplomats and scholars have in private cited the formula of “jointdevelopment while setting aside sovereignty” for solving the SouthChina Sea imbroglio. This modus operandi was used during thetheoretical accord reached between President Hu Jintao andthen-Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in 2008 for settlingsovereignty disputes over the East China Sea. Yet, Beijing and Tokyohave since failed to go one step further by formalizing the Hu-Fukudaagreement into a full-fledged treaty. One possible reason is oppositionto the “joint development” formula expressed by Chinese nationalists aswell as PLA generals (China Daily, August 4; Stratfor.com, February 22).

Itseems evident that the hawkish views of PLA generals are having adominant influence on Beijing’s foreign and security policies towardthe United States, the Korean Peninsula, Japan and the South China Sea.Military officers are vociferous supporters of the maximalist extensionof the parameters of China’s hexin liyi. The generals are also believedto be adamant supporters of the Kim Jong-Il regime. This is despitePyongyang’s continuation of its nuclear weapons program as well as itsalleged role in sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan in late March.Other examples of hard-line military thinking influencing nationalpolicy include the denial of an invitation to Secretary of DefenseRobert Gates to visit China while the latter was in Asia last June (NewYork Times, June 4; Time Asia Edition, July 22). 

Typical ofthe hardliners’ views are those of two PLA major-generals, who enjoyhigh exposure in the official media. Academy of Military Sciencesscholar and strategist Luo Yuan was one of the first opinion-makers whospoke out against plans, first announced in June, that joint U.S.-SouthKorean exercises would be conducted in the Yellow Sea. The generalgained national fame by using the earthy expression, “how can we let astranger fall sound asleep just outside our bedroom?” to indicateBeijing’s indignation at the maneuvers. General Luo ratcheted up therhetoric when reacting to news that the Yellow Sea drills have now beenscheduled for late summer. He quoted Chairman Mao’s pugilisticdictum—“If people don’t offend me, I won’t offend them; if people runafoul of me, I will surely hit them back”—on the fact that Chinesemilitary forces should take a strong stance against perceivedmanifestations of America’s “hegemonism, gunboat diplomacy andunilateralism” (PLA Daily, August 12; Ming Pao, August 13).

RealAdmiral Yang Yi, another much-quoted military commentator, has gone onestep further by accusing Washington of double-dealing in addition toexacerbating its time-honored containment policy against China. “On theone hand, it [Washington] wants China to play a role in regionalsecurity issues,” Yang wrote in the PLA Daily on August 13. “On theother hand, it is engaging in an increasingly tight encirclement ofChina and constantly challenging China's core interests.” General Yangadded that American-led military drills in the region were aimed atprovoking “enmity and confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region—and thatthe Chinese must make a firm response. “Washington will inevitably paya costly price for its muddled decision,” Yang noted in another articlein the official China Daily (PLA Daily, August 13; Reuters, August 13;China Daily, August 13).

When asked about the preeminence ofmilitary voices in the debate over how to beat back the Americanchallenge, Major-General Xu Guangyu, another noted hawk, indicated that“it’s natural for the PLA to speak out first on these issues.” Xu, aresearcher at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association,added, “It’s the PLA’s sacred duty to defend China’s territory andinterests.” It is also true, however, that the generals may have seizedupon the downward spiral in Sino-U.S. ties—and the overall tension inthe Asia-Pacific Region—to lobby for more economic and politicalresources to upgrade their arsenal. Particularly in view of large-scalepersonnel changes scheduled for the upcoming 18th CCP Congress,President Hu needs the top brass’s backing for the elevation ofnumerous affiliates of his Communist Youth League faction, includingSixth-Generation rising stars such as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary HuChunhua (Reuters, August 12; South China Morning Post, August 4; AppleDaily, August 13).

That the CCP leadership has allowedmoderate messages to be aired, however, seems to indicate that supremoHu is willing to consider dovish as well as hawkish approaches to keyissues such as the definition of China’s core interests—and how theymay be best defended in the face of what Beijing perceives to be thetoughest American onslaught since President Obama took office lastyear. In either case, however, this essentially means that as Chinabecomes stronger—and requires more resources to sustain its marchtoward superpower status—its list of core interests will growaccordingly.
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“Where’s the Nearest (U.S.) Carrier?” SPECIAL-REPORT


China’s military planners covet the ability toprevent U.S. and allied forces from intervening effectively in theevent of a future Taiwan Strait crisis and to constrain the latter’sinfluence on China’s maritime periphery, which contains severaldisputed zones of core strategic importance to Beijing. In order toachieve the aforementioned goals, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)has been pursuing a two-level approach to military modernization, withconsistent focus on increasingly formidable high-end ‘anti-access/areadenial’ (A2/AD) capabilities to support major combat operations inChina’s ‘Near Seas’ (Yellow, East, and South) and their approaches, andrelatively low-intensity but gradually growing capabilities toinfluence strategic conditions further afield (e.g., in the IndianOcean) in China’s favor.

In July-August 1995 and March 1996,concerns about Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s measures that Chineseleaders associated with moves toward de jure independence of Taiwan ledBeijing to conduct missile tests and other military exercises near theStrait. To deter further escalation, then U.S. President WilliamClinton dispatched two carrier strike groups (CSGs) toward the regionin March 1996, later remarking, “When word of crisis breaks out inWashington, it’s no accident the first question that comes toeveryone’s lips is: where is the nearest carrier?” [1]. In theunfortunate event of a future U.S.-China military crisis, however, itis Chinese leaders who would be asking where the nearest U.S. carrieris, albeit for the opposite reason.


Since 1996, China hasmethodically developed and acquired the technologies that could holdU.S. and allied military platforms and their supporting assets at riskin the Western Pacific [2], thereby positioning China on the affordableend of any asymmetric arms races. This matches Beijing’s larger ‘activedefense’ military doctrine, which is based partially on ‘non-linear,non-contact and asymmetric’ operations. Non-linear operations involvelaunching attacks from multiple platforms in an unpredictable fashionthat range across an opponent’s operational and strategic depth.Non-contact operations entail targeting enemy platforms and weaponssystems with precision attacks from a distance sufficient topotentially preclude the enemy from strikin back directly. Asymmetricoperations involve exploiting inherent physics-based limitations tomatch Chinese strengths against an opponent’s weaknesses [3].

Atpresent, China’s submarine-focused navy and still-limited air and navalaviation forces can only support a more limited strategy of sea denialand offensive counter-air as opposed to outright control. This A2/ADstrategy is ever-more-potent, however, thanks to a vast and growinginventory of short-range ballistic and cruise missiles deployed incoastal units and on a variety of air, surface, and undersea platforms.The PLA is improving rapidly in many areas, and has manifold advantageson which to draw, particularly in its proximity to, and focus on, themost likely scenario—a multi-vector PLA offensive to pressure Taiwaninto reunification.

Potential Game Changers

In additionto widespread incremental improvements, China is on the verge ofachieving several paradigm-shifting breakthroughs: anti-ship ballisticmissiles, or ASBMs; streaming cruise missile attacks; precise andreliable indigenous satellite navigation, high quality real timesatellite imagery, and target-locating data; and anti-satellite (ASAT)and other space-related weapons, which might be used to disrupt U.S.access to information, command and control, and ability to remotelycontrol weapons. Such achievements promise to radically improve China’sA2/AD capabilities by allowing it to hold at risk a wide variety ofsurface- and air-based assets were they to enter strategically vitalzones on China’s contested maritime periphery in the event of conflict.

Of perhaps greatest concern, Beijing is pursuing an ASBM basedon the DF-21D/CSS-5 solid propellant medium-range ballistic missile. ADF-21D ASBM would have two stages, and a reentry vehicle (RV) with aseeker, control fins and a warhead (unitary, submunitions, orconventional electro-magnetic pulse). In operation, some combination ofland-, sea- and space-based sensors would first detect the relevantsea-surface target. While locating an aircraft carrier has been likenedto finding a needle in a haystack, this particular ‘needle’ has a largeradar cross section, emits radio waves and is surrounded by airplanes.Simply looking for the biggest radar reflection to target will tend tolocate the largest ship—and the largest ship will usually be anaircraft carrier. The ASBM would be launched from atransporter-erector-launcher on a ballistic trajectory aimed roughly atthe target, most likely a CSG. After jettisoning its stages, the RVwould use its seeker (possibly radar-homing or infrared) to locate andattack the CSG. This could be supplemented by targeting updates ifnecessary. The DF-21D’s 1,500 km+ range could result in denial ofaccess to a large maritime area, far beyond Taiwan and the First IslandChain into the Western Pacific.

Admiral Robert F. Willard,Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, recently stated in Tokyo: “To ourknowledge, [China’s ASBM] has undergone repeated tests, and it isprobably very close to being operational” (Asahi Shimbun, August 24).What sort of ASBM “tests” China is conducting remains unclear, but thesequence and convergence of multiple factors suggest that some form offlight tests may be useful and important for deploying suchcapabilities. While system components may be tested separately, and onthe ground in many cases, a fully integrated flight test is likely tobe necessary to give the PLA confidence in approving full-scaleproduction and deploying ASBMs in an operational state. If and when theDF-21D is developed sufficiently, particularly during a time ofstrategic tension or crisis, Beijing might reveal a test to theworld—with or without advance warning—in some way geared to influencingofficial and public opinion in the United States, Taiwan, Japan, andelsewhere in the Asia-Pacific [4]. Alternatively, unpublicized flighttests could be conducted to deter foreign militaries without alarmingforeign publics (though information might ultimately reach themregardless). The fact of a hit, however manipulated and revealed, couldchange the strategic equation that planners on the both sides use inmaking difficult decisions.
China has a clear and compellingstrategic rationale, sufficient resources (from the world’s secondlargest official [emphasis added] defense budget at $78 billion), andthe requisite technological expertise (having prioritized ballisticmissiles and related infrastructure since the late 1950s) to progressrapidly in ASBM development. Patterns in a wide variety of open sourcepublications offer indications that this is in fact occurring. Chinamay already be producing DF-21D rocket motors, having reportedlycompleted a purpose-built factory in August 2009 [5]. Likewiseimportant is the recent launch of multiple advanced Yaogan surveillancesatellites for a total of 11 in operation, three of which wereapparently placed in the same orbit on March 5 (See “PLA ExpandsNetwork of Military Reconnaissance Satellites,” China Brief, August19). Another possible indication is a recent news release attributed toChina Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation citing Wang Genbin,deputy director of its 4th Department, as stating that the DF-21D cannow hit “slow-moving targets” with a circular error probability of(meaning half of missiles fired will strike within) dozens of meters[6]. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stokes, USAF, and Tiffany Mahinted that the Second Artillery may be constructing its first ASBMmissile brigade facilities (Unit 96166) in the northern GuangdongProvince municipality of Shaoguan (AsiaEye, August 3). A recent GlobalTimes editorial goes so far as to advocate that to end “speculation” byWestern intelligence agencies, “China ought to convince theinternational community of its reliable carrier-killing capacity assoon as possible” and “should also let Westerners know under whatcircumstances will such weaponry be used” (Global Times [Englishedition], September 6).
An ASBM system of systems, ifdeveloped and deployed successfully, would be the world’s first weaponssystem capable of targeting a moving CSG hundreds of kilometers fromChina’s shores from long-range, land-based mobile launchers. This couldpose a new type of threat to the U.S. Navy qualitatively different fromthat of, for example, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Unlike withASCMs, the United States has not had decades to address the newchallenge; interception is far more complex and time sensitive; and,even assuming that they can be located with confidence, highlyconcealable land-based launch platforms or supporting C4ISR (command,control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance) infrastructure cannot be targeted without contemplatinghighly escalatory strikes in mainland China.

Tracking a Moving Target

Centralto maximizing Beijing’s ability to employ ASBMs and related systemswill be effective utilization of ISR, the collection and processing ofinformation concerning potential military targets. An emerging networkof space-based sensors promises to radically improve the targetingcapabilities of China’s Navy and other services with which it mayoperate, for example, the Second Artillery.

China’s satellitecapabilities, while far from cutting-edge in many respects, areimproving rapidly. China today has only a fraction of the overall spacecapability of the United States, still has major gaps in coverage inevery satellite application and relies to a considerable extent ontechnology acquired through non-military programs with foreigncompanies and governments. China will likely purchase commercialimagery products to supplement its current surveillance capabilitiesuntil it is able to deploy a more advanced set of reconnaissancesatellites in the coming decade. Such a capability could greatlyimprove China’s ability to monitor force deployments on its periphery.Beijing is combining foreign knowledge with increasingly robustindigenous capabilities to produce significant advances of its own.China’s satellite developers are experimenting with a new workplaceculture that emphasizes modern management, standardization, qualitycontrol, and emerging mass production ability. China has developed afull range of military, civilian and dual-use satellites of variousmission areas and sizes.

Improvements in access to foreign anddomestic navigation-positioning systems increase the accuracy ofChinese missiles and other position-dependent equipment, anddevelopment of a viable independent system could improve Chinese accessto reliable signals in conflict. China’s current four-satelliteBeidou-1 constellation, deployed in 2007, is limited to supportingoperations on China’s immediate maritime periphery and providingnavigation coverage accurate to within about 20 m. To reliably supportbroader operations, China is deploying a 35-satellite (5 geostationary,30 medium earth orbit) constellation—called Beidou-2/Compass—that wouldprovide much-improved accuracy, with regional navigation andcommunications coverage anticipated by 2011 and global navigationcoverage by 2015-20 [7]. Four satellites have been launched thus far.

Giventheir potential for high resolution and accuracy, satellites willenhance Chinese ISR capabilities. China’s imaging satellites withsufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSGare currently inadequate for continuous satellite coverage based onrevisit times for specific ocean areas. China may, however, launchsufficient satellites to achieve coverage regionally (8-12 civilian,plus additional military) by 2015 and globally (a further 8-12civilian, plus additional military) by 2020 [8]. Even before then,China’s emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets mayallow it to achieve a satellite surge capability. China’s low-costlaunchers (e.g. Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaroundand efficiency. The upgrading of Wenchang Satellite Launch Center,China’s fourth, indicates a commitment to cutting-edge infrastructure[9].

Conclusion

Emerging Chinese A2/AD capabilitiesshould concern not only the U.S. Navy but also the U.S. military as awhole, whose operations in East Asia writ large could be affected.Similar challenges threatening to hold U.S. platforms at risk in vitalareas of the global maritime commons are emerging in the Persian Gulfand might eventually materialize elsewhere.

Ongoing Chineselimitations include deficiencies in human capital, realism of training,hardware and operations, C4ISR, and real-time data fusion, as well asuncertainties on China’s part about the extent to which it can detecttargets and achieve geographical and temporal fires deconfliction withexisting systems and strategies. Chinese ASBM development in particularfaces serious challenges, e.g., in the areas of detection, targeting,data fusion, joint service operations, and bureaucratic coordination. Asenior U.S. Department of Defense official recently indicated that,“the primary area … where we see them still facing roadblocks is inintegrating the missile system with the C4-ISR. And they still have aways to go before they manage to get that integrated so that they havean operational and effective system”  [10].

Yet China has manyways to mitigate limitations for kinetic operations around Taiwan orother areas of its maritime periphery and potentially for non-kineticpeacetime operations further afield. The PLA can augment C2 and targetdeconfliction by employing landlines, high-power line-of-sightcommunications, advanced planning, and geographic and temporalsegregation. Its strength is relative to its objective, and here Chinamay be extremely capable of achieving its specific goals. China neednot keep pace with the U.S. technologically for its incrementaldevelopments to have disproportionate impact. The U.S. is inherentlyexposed because it operates offensively on exterior lines, and muststruggle to maintain technological superiority to reduce thisvulnerability.

China’s diverse, rapidly-evolving, interactiveC4ISR architecture remains different than that of the U.S., even as itincreases in coverage and sophistication. To reach the next level ofcapability in safeguarding China’s core interests, the PLA has to beable to locate a CSG on the ocean, but only in regions from which theCSG can strike China, and that is necessarily different from what theU.S. military has to do. Given the Chinese Navy’s cultivation of amaritime militia and civilian vessels, and the PLA’s apparent emphasison cyber capabilities, it is not inconceivable that at least somerudimentary targeting data might be obtained via unconventional means.These factors suggest that U.S. analysts must not ‘mirror image’ whenassessing China’s ISR targeting capabilities or assume that satellitecapabilities are themselves definitive.

A2/AD affords China astrategic defensive posture along interior lines. Overall U.S.qualitative, and even numerical, superiority in advanced platforms andsystems is of limited relevance for two reasons. First, the platformsmost likely to be employed are those that are based within immediatestriking distance at the outbreak of conflict; here China inherentlyenjoys theater concentration, while U.S. platforms are dispersedglobally. Second, aircraft sent to the theater needs airfields fromwhich to operate; here U.S. regional options are limited geographicallyand politically, and are vulnerable to Chinese missile attack.

Whileconflict is by no means foreordained, and interaction and cooperationshould be pursued whenever feasible and equitable, the challengepresented by China’s emerging A2/AD infrastructure cannot be ignored.Long before a crisis, and to deter one from ever erupting, U.S. leadersneed to ask, “Where are threats to our carriers, and how can we counterthem?” 

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